RESIDENCY
WHAT IT IS
OBJECTING TO AND DEFENDING RESIDENCY
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR VARIOUS OFFICES

RESIDENCY: WHAT IT IS

Section 5/3-2 of the Illinois Election Code (10 ILCS 5/3-2) states that an Aabode@ is necessary to establish residency. In order to establish an Aabode@, also refferd to as a principal dwelling place, Illinois case law requires that two separate elements exist: (1) a physical presence and (2) an intent to remain and establish a permanent home. ( See Stein 85 Ill. App.2d at 256 and cited in Delk 112 Ill. App.3d at 738; Miller 349 NE2d 458; also see Hughs 2 Ill.2d 374 and Coffey 375 Ill. 385.) The purpose of such requirements is to assure that voters and candidates Ahave been in the political subdivision in which they are to vote or run a sufficient length of time in which to become informed on the issues; that they intend to remain there; and that they will have an honest interest@ in local matters. ( See Stein v. County Board of School Trustees, 85 Ill.App.2d 251, 229 N.E.2d 165, 169 (2d Dist. 1967), aff'd, 40 Ill.2d 477, 240 N.E.2d668 (1968) ). Simply stated, a residence is A [a] real and not imaginary abode occupied as [a] home or dwelling.@ Pope v. Board of Elections Commissioners, 370 Ill. 196, 18 N.E.2d 214, 216 (1938).

Residency cases typically turn on a weighing of evidence allegedly supporting one place (abode) as opposed to evidence probative of another. Clark v. Quick, 377 Ill. 424, 36 N.E.2nd565, 568-569 (1941), Pope v. Board of Election Commissioners, 370 Ill. 196, 198, 202-203 (1938); Delk v. Board of Election Commissioners, 112 Ill. App.3d 735, 739, 445 N.E.2d 1232 (1st Dist. 1983); Greene v. Board of Election Commissioners, 112 Ill. App. 3d 862, 445 N.E.2d 1337 (1st Dist. 1983). In determining a person's residency, that person's Adeclaration is not necessarily conclusive, because it may be disproved by his acts.@ Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 125 Ill 141, 194-196, 17 N.E. 232 (1888). See also Anderson v.Pifer, 315 Ill. 164, 146 N.E. 171 (1924). Consequently, Aacts and circumstances are more persuasive than mere declarations in making the case for a factual determination of intent.@ Stein v. County Board of School Trustees of DuPage County, 85 Ill. App. 2d 251, 259-260 N.E.2d 165 (2nd Dist. 1967), aff'd. 40 Ill. 2d 477, 240 N.E.2d 668 (1967); Miller v. Police Board, 38 Ill. App. 3d 894, 349 N.E.2d 544 (1st Dist. 1976); Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Argubright, 151 Ill. App. 3d 324, 502 N.E. 2d 868, 872 (3rd Dist. 1986); app.den. 114 Ill.2d 543 (1986). Illinois recognizes several common indicia of residency and although personal declarations of intent are certainly considered. Automobile registrations and utility subscriptions for gas, electric, and telephone service. See e.g., Miller, supra, 349 N.E. 2d at 546, 548; Delk, supra, 112 Ill. App.3d at 735, 737, 739. Additionally, the location where one regularly receives mail or actually has a lease are significant factors. See e.g. Delk, supra, 112 IllApp. 3d at 739; Stein, supra, as Ill.App.2d at 259. On the other hand, such things as merely leaving some clothes at a particular location or Aan arrangement...that [one] could come and stay there any time he wanted to@, (Clark v. Quick, supra, 36 N.E.2d at 568, 569) or that his property was in the safe-keeping of another, Flowers v. Keller, 322 Ill 265, 267-268, 153 N.E.2d 351, or that one simply owns property, Delk, supra, 112 Ill.App3d at 739; Dillavou v. County Officers Electoral Board of Sangamon County, 260 Ill.App3d 127, 632 N.E. 2d 1127, are not sufficient alone to establish residency

Other issues involving residency that have been the subject of frequent litigation are whether the legislatures can require a minimum time limit for residency, what that minimum may be and how it is to be determined. The answer to the first, in short, is Ayes@. Essentially, that the basis for this is that a person cannot have two Aabodes@ in different places at the same time and accordingly, an abode can be abandoned and established. . Miller v. State Board of Elections, 1989 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3816 Clark v. Quick, 377 Ill.424, 36 N.E.2d 563 (1941).

RESIDENCE OR DOMICILE - IS THERE A DIFFERENCE ?

If you plan to work in the area of election law, one should tread cautiously when dealing with domicile and residency. Whether a person maintains a residency or a domicile is a subtle questions, a distinction sometimes lost even by the courts. However, a residence is not the same as a Adomicile@. Clark v. Quick, supra ; Stein, supra. A Aresidence@ is a real and not imaginary abode@. It is Aa definite place of abode@; and Aa permanent place of abode@. Clark v. Quick, supra, Park v. Hood, 347 Ill. 36, 27 N.E.2d 834 (1940) the word Aresidence@ consequently Ameans more than one technical domicile@. Pope, supra, 370 Ill. At 203. Unlike a Adomicile@, which one has continually from the moment of birth, a person need not at all times have a legal residency, i.e. a Apermanent abode@. Huber v. Reznick, 107 Ill. App. 3d 529, 473 N.E.2d 828 (1982). It is entirely possible for a person to not have a legal place of residence at a particular given point in time. Stein, supra, 85 Ill. App. 2d at 257; Clark, supra, 377 Ill. At 426. A Aresidence@ implies the existence of a Asettled@ and Afixed abode@ [Romaine v. Black, 304 IllApp 1, 11, 25 N.E.2d 404 (1939) ]; and Aa relatively permanent habitat@ [In re R.D.H., 68 Ill.App.3d 299, 302 (4th Dist. 1979) }; in no more than one place at a time. Delk, supra, 112 Ill.App3d at 739, Miller, supra, 38 Ill.App. 3d at 898.

OBJECTING TO RESIDENCY:

The following are a few cases in which objections to residency have been sustained as well as a short synopsis of their individual circumstances. Also provided in Appendix I is a sample objection to residency, and Appendix II provides a checklist of items to be requested when litigating such objections.

In Stein v. County Bd. of Sch. Trustees, 85 Ill. App. 2d 251, 229 N.E.2d 165 (2 Dist. 1967), aff'd, 40 Ill. 2d 477, 240 N.E.2d 668 (1968), the court held that if a person physically leaves what has been his permanent abode and at any time during his absence acquires an unconditional intent not to return, his former abode is no longer his residence; not withstanding, however, he may or may not at that time have a new permanent abode or residence. Felice v. City of Countryside Electoral Board provides an example of an objection to the 1-year residency requirement which was upheld by both the Circuit Court of Cook County and the First District Appellate Court. In this case an objection was made based upon a failure of the candidate to meet the State's 1-year residency requirement for municipal candidates. Although the candidate had lived in his home for several years, the home had been annexed into the City only six months prior to the election. The candidate argued, but to no avail, that his residency at the same location for well in excess of a year established the same community interest as is intended by the residency requirement.

Weil v. Harris, No. 93-CEOB-11 (Cook County Electoral Board), aff=d, No 94 CO 0059 provides an example of a candidate disqualified because he established Anone, or nearly none of the normal indicia@ of a change of legal residency.

DEFENDING RESIDENCY:

The following are cases in which objections based upon failure to establish residency have been overruled. Also, provided in Appendix III is a form which can be used in replying to a residency objections with regard to both candidates as well as a circulators. It also raises some important points with regard to residency and the applicable case law.

As our Supreme Court has said, a person's Adeclaration is not necessarily conclusive, because it may be disproven by his acts.@ Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 125 Ill. 141, 194-195, 17 N.E. 232 . See also Anderson v. Pifer, 315 Ill. 164, 146 N.E. 171 (1924). However, depending upon one's actions, it is entirely possible for a person to not have a legal place of residence (a permanent place of abode) at a particular given time. Stein, supra, 85 Ill.App.2d at 257.

For an objection based on residency which was unsuccessful, see Meyers v. Voters= Vision Party (Shiller Park Electoral Board February 18, 1997). In that case, the candidate - circulator was legally barred from her residency after a domestic dispute. After considering the multifaceted professional, business and personal relationship of the parties, the Electoral Board denied the objection and appended to its decision a legal memorandum on residency that may be helpful. Also see Pipes v. Howe, No 97-EB-RGA-003 (Chicago Electoral Board)

In Dillavou v. County Officers Electoral Bd., 260 Ill. App. 3d 127, 198 Ill. Dec. 516, 632 N.E.2d 1127 (4 Dist.), appeal denied, 157 Ill. 2d 498, 205 Ill. Dec. 159, 642 N.E.2d 1276 (1994), the court held that there was sufficient evidence upon which the electoral board could conclude that a candidate for election as state representative satisfied the residency requirements 18 months before the General Election in that he: (1) established a physical presence within the representative district by leasing an apartment, moving in and occupying it; (2) testified that he intended to abandon his prior residential property and become a resident of the district for the purpose of running for reelection; and (3) presented undisputed evidence that he had made an offer to purchase a home within the appropriate school districts, the purchase of which would have dispelled any question about his residency had the sale been consummated. The court also stated that a person can acquire a domicile if he is personally present in a place and elects that as his home even if he never intends to remain in that particular physical structure on a permanent basis.

Walsh v. County Officers Electoral Bd., 267 Ill. App. 3d 972, 204 Ill. Dec. 942, 642 N.E.2d 843 sustained an Electoral Board's finding that a candidate for state office established physical presence in a new district and that, although the candidate moved to the district with the express intent of being eligible to run for representative from that district, his motivation did not negate a genuine change of residence. It is important to note this is another case in which the court pointed out that surrounding circumstances shall be accorded more weight than simple declarations of intent.

For Additional considerations in establishing residency, courts have looked to:

- Awhere an individual maintains personal belongings and family@
Kreitz v. Behernsmeyer, 135 Ill 591, 26 N.E. 704
- boards or takes meals
Widmayer v. Davis, 231 Ill. 42, 83 N.E. 87
- locates furniture
Dirst v. McDonald, 372 Ill. 498, 24 N.E.2d 36
- moves with family
Carter v. Putnam, 141 Ill. 133, 30 N.E. 681
-lives and works [
Blakenship v. Isreal, 132 Ill. 514, 24 N.E. 615
sleeps, eats, and conducts business
Carter v. Putnam, supra, 141 Ill. At 136-137

RESIDENCY TIME REQUIREMENTS IN ILLINOIS:

It is axiomatic that one must be a duly qualified and registered voter in order to seek office. Therefore, residency of a candidate will be tested under Illinois law not only as of the date of the filing of the statement of candidacy, but also on the date of registration to vote. Delk v. Board, supra, 445 N.E.2d at 1235. Accord, Deseki v. McCullough, 86-EB-WC-53 (1986) (Chicago Electoral Board). Failure to meet this test for residency at either point in time voids the candidacy.

The following are the residency requirements for most elected offices in Illinois.

1. Congress: A candidate for United States Senate or House of Representatives must be a resident of the State of Illinois as of the date of election. U.S. CONST. art. I, '2.

2. State Constitutional Officers: A candidate for the office of Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Secretary of State, Treasurer, or Comptroller must be a resident of Illinois for the three years preceding his eventual election. ILL.CONST. art. V, '3.

3. State Legislator: Any candidate for election to the state legislature must be a resident of the district to be represented for the two years preceding election. ILL.CONST. art IV, '2(c). An exception is made for the General Election following a redistricting. In that case, a candidate Amay be elected from any district which contains a part of the district in which he or she resided at the time of the redistricting@ provided there has been residency Ain the new district@ for 18 months preceding election. ILL.CONST. art. IV, '2(c).

4. County Officials: ACounty offices@ are defined in the ILL.CONST.art. VII, '4, and. Candidates are required to be Aelectors in the particular county at the time of their election@, or Aqualified voters therein@

5. Mayors, Municipal Officers, and Aldermen: Generally, mayors and municipal officers must be Aqualified elector(s) of the municipality@ who have resided in that municipality Aat least one year next preceding . . . election or appointment.@ See, e.g., 65 ILCS &&3-14-1, 6-3-0(1). Additionally, aldermen must also reside within the actual ward they represent. See, e.g., ILCS &&3-4-15(1), 5-2-10(1), 6-3-9(2). Local ordinances sometimes add other specific restrictions that should be consulted. See also Chapter 14 on local elections.

6 Ward, Township, and Precinct Committeemen: All candidates for these party offices must reside within the specific political subdivision from which election is sought. ILCS &7-8(b).

7. State Central Committeemen and Committeewomen: Must reside in and run to represent their own home congressional districts. ILCS &7-8(a), 7-8(b). See Solis Case

8. Voter: 10 ILCS 5/3-1. Every person who has resided in this State and in the election district 30 days next preceding any election therein, is entitled to vote at such election for all offices and on all propositions.

9. Petition Circulator : There are no residency requirements.

Appendix I
STATE OF ILLINOIS )
) SS
COUNTY OF COOK )

IN THE MATTER OF THE OBJECTIONS )
OF _________________ TO THE NOMINATING )
PETITION OF ____________________ , AS A )
CANDIDATE FOR ELECTION TO THE OFFICE )
OF OF THE )
CITY OF , TO BE VOTED UPON AT )
THE FEBRUARY ____, ______ ELECTION. )

VERIFIED OBJECTOR'S PETITION

NOW COMES____________________, hereinafter referred to as the AObjector@, and respectfully represent that Objector resides at the following address: __________, within__________ the of the City of __________, County of Cook, State of Illinois; that Objector is duly qualified, registered, and legal voters at such addresses; that Objector's interest in filing the following objections is that of a citizen desirous of seeing to it that the laws governing the filing of nominating petitions for election to the office of __________are properly complied with and that only qualified candidates have their names appear upon the ballot as candidates for the aforesaid office; and therefore your Objector makes the following objections to the nominating petition of _________________ as a candidate for election to the office of __________, and files the same herewith, and states that the said nominating petition is insufficient in law and in fact for the following reasons:

1. Your Objector states that in the __________nominating petitions for election to the office of __________require the signatures of not less than _____________ duly qualified, registered, and legal voters of the said Ward collected and filed in a proper and legal form and manner, together with various supporting documents as required by law.

2. Your Objector states that the Candidate has filed his nominating petitions representing to the public, swearing under oath and certifying that he is a duly qualified, registered, and legal voter from, and legal resident of , __________, when , in fact, he is not a legal resident at the address given in all of his nominating petitions.

3. Your Objector further states the Candidate actually legally resides at __________, which address is not located within the boundaries of making the Candidate statutorily and constitutionally ineligible to seek election to the office of __________.

4. The Candidate has filed a false, fraudulent, and perjurious Statement of Candidacy wherein he swears under oath that he is in fact a qualified voter residing at __________when, in fact, he resides at an address outside of __________.

5. Your Objector states that the Candidate has executed a false change of registration on __________, __________, at which time he swore that his legal place of residence was when, in fact, he resided at __________.

6. Your objector states that the Candidate personally circulated two (2) petition signature sheets in which he has executed false Circulator Affidavits stating under oath that he is a registered voter of __________residing in __________when, in fact, he resides at __________.

7. Your objector states that each and every one of the petition signatures sheets filed contains a false statement in the introductory portion to the effect that the Candidate is a duly qualified, registered and legal voter from, and resident of, __________, when, in fact, he is not.

8. Your Objector, with investigation continuing, intends to produce documentary, testimonial, and other evidence to support these allegations.

9. Your Objector states that the nominating petition herein contested purports to consist of various sheets supposedly containing the valid and legal signatures of ____ individuals.

WHEREFORE, your Objector prays that the purported nominating petition of _________ as a candidate for election to the office of , be declared by this Honorable Board to be insufficient and not in compliance with the laws of the State of Illinois and that the Candidate's name be stricken and that this Honorable Board enter its decision declaring that the name of __________as a candidate for election to the office BE NOT PRINTED upon the OFFICIAL BALLOT for the Aldermanic Election to be held on __________.

OBJECTOR'S
NAME & ADDRESS

VERIFICATION BY CERTIFICATION

Under penalties as provided by law pursuant to Sec. 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the undersigned certify that the statements set forth in this VERIFIED OBJECTOR'S PETITION are true and correct, except as to matters therein stated to be on information and belief and as to verily believe the same to be true.

______________________________________
OBJECTOR

Appendix II
RESIDENCY CHECK LIST

Auto Club Card/Statements
Automobile Registrations
Bank Statements Address
Case No. of Filing for Legal Separation or Divorce
Change of Address with Employer
Christmas Cards
Contribution to Landlord's Expenses (e.g. utilities)
Credit Card Billing Statements
Current Blank Checks
Date of Relocation
Description of Living Quarters
Driver's Licence
Electric Bill
Employment Paycheck Stubs
Federal Tax Return
Furniture Moved into Apartment
Gas Bill
Gas Credit Card Statements
Government Notices Received by Mail
High School Registration for Children
How Often Slept at Premises
Insurance Policies (Auto/Life)
Interior Photographs
Invoices for Rug Cleaning From Moving In
Invs. For Health, Life, Fire, Auto, Disability, or Inc. Prot. Ins.
Landlord Testimony
Lease
Library Card
Listing in Telephone Directory Assistance
Location Used by Person on the Property
Magazine/Newspaper Subscriptions
Management of Family Affairs (Situs)
Merrill Lynch-Dreyfus-Prudential-Coldwell Banker, Etc. Statements
Monthly Church Donation Envelopes
Moving Van or U-Haul Bill
No. of People Who Knew of Move
Non AJunk Mail@ Received
Notice of Electoral Board Call
Personal Business Cards
Personal Correspondence Received by Mail
Phone Bill
Phone No. Registration in Reverse Directory
Phone No./Address on D-1 Financial Disclosure Forms
Picture ID Cards
Place of Holiday Celebrations
Proof Estranged from Husband
Property Tax Bill
Receipts for Car Repairs
Receipts for UPS Delivery
Rent Receipts
Renter's Insurance Policy
School Registrations for Minor Children
Security Deposit Receipts
Sheriff's Return
Spouse Testimony
State Tax Return
Time It Took to Move
Union or other Group Membership Cards
U.S. Postal Change of Address of Card
Voter's Card
W-2 Forms
Who Helped Move
Who Helped Move
Work ID Card
Witnesses:
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________

APPENDIX III
BEFORE THE __________MUNICIPAL OFFICERS ELECTORAL BOARD
__________ , )
Petitioner-Objector, )
)
vs. )
) No.
__________, )
)
Respondent-Candidates. )

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO OBJECTIONS ON RESIDENCY ISSUE

The candidates, by their attorneys, , respectfully submit this brief in opposition to the objector's position on residency issues.

INTRODUCTION

Residency cases are hardly unique in election law. There are many cases involving candidates who set up Afake@ residences within election districts, away from their spouses and families, in order to run for political office. This case presents an unusual twist to that scenario B a candidate who is temporarily absent from her residence and who has established no new residence. Under these circumstances, as we explain below, Illinois law clearly provides that the candidate can (and must) maintain a candidacy from that residence, and not from another, temporary, address.

ARGUMENT

I. ILLINOIS LAW STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE RIGHT TO VOTE AND TO RUN FOR PUBLIC OFFICE

This case involves the challenge to a candidacy for __________. A few introductory principles concerning ballot access are appropriate. First, the Election Code provides that the candidate's nomination papers are deemed valid until proven otherwise. 10 ILCS 5/10-8. The burden was on the objector to show not only that the stated candidacy address was not a valid residence under the Election Code, but also to show what the candidate's residence was.

It can be said with confidence that the right to vote, on the one hand, and the right to seek office on the other, are among the most cherished in this land. Thus, the Supreme Court has said, in connection with restrictions on access to the ballot generally:
Restrictions on access to the ballot burden two distinct and fundamental rights, the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast ballots effectively. [Citation.] * * * Access restrictions also implicate the right to vote because absent recourse to referendums, voters can assert their preferences only through candidates or parties or both. [Citation.] By limiting the choices available to voters, the State impairs the voters' ability to express their political preferences. And for reasons too self-evident to warrant amplification here, we have often reiterated that voting is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure. [Citations.]

Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 59 L.Ed.2d 230, 99 S.Ct. 983, 990 (1979).

Illinois courts have also observed in a variety of contexts that there is a dual import to ballot access. In McGuire v. Nogaj, 146 Ill. App. 3d 280, 285, 496 N.E.2d 1037, the court observed: Athe right of a party or an individual to place on a ballot is entitled to protection and is intertwined with the rights of the voters.@ (Quoting Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716, 39 L.Ed.2d 702, 708, 94 S.Ct. 1314, 1320.) The McGuire court further noted that this state has a policy in Afavor of a candidate's eligibility@ (146 III.App. 3d at 285), and the Illinois Supreme Court has observed that the right of access to the ballot is a substantial one which may not lightly be denied. Welch v. Johnson, 147 Ill. 2d 40, 588 N.E.2d 1119 (1992).

It is with these principles that the law must be analyzed and this case considered. While Aresidence@ questions arise in matters of real estate law, municipal employment requirements and tax base questions, these areas of the law concerning residency have different goals and different policies pertain to the resolution of those non-election cases.

II. THE CANDIDATE MEETS THE LEGAL REQUIREMENT OF RESIDENCY.

The specific allegation in the objector's petition is that the candidate, contrary to the statement in the Objection does not reside at the stated candidacy address in__________ . No other residence is specifically cited. Under the election Code, A[a] permanent abode is necessary to constitute a residence.@ 10 ILCS 5/3-2. To establish such an abode within the meaning of the Election Code, two elements are necessary: Aphysical presence and intent to remain there as a permanent home.@ 10 ILCS 5/3-2. This requirement furthers the goal that voters and candidates have been in the pertinent area long enough to become informed upon the issue, that they intend to remain in the area and have an honest interest in local matters. Stein v. Count Board of School Trustees, 85 Ill. App. 2d 251, 229 N.E.2d 165, 169 (1967), aff'd 40 Ill. 2d 477 (1980). Before a change of residence can occur, there must Abe, both in fact and intention, an abandonment of the former residence, and a new domicile acquired by actual residence, coupled with the intention to make it a permanent home.@ Welch v. Shumway, 232 Ill. 54, 83 N.E.2d 549, 559.

The intent which is required is not, of course, one which applies to all time. As the Illinois Supreme court explained long ago in the case of Dale v. Irwin 78 Ill. 170, 181-82 (1875):

No man in active life, in this State, can say, wherever he may be placed, this is and ever shall be my permanent abode. It would be safe to say a permanent abode, in the sense of the [election] statute, means nothing more than a domicile, a home which the party is at liberty to leave, as interest or whom may dictate, but without any present intention to change it.

The question of residence is largely a question of intent. (Blankenship v Israel, 132 Ill. 514 (1890).) Moreover, a voter is competent to testify as to his intention, although such testimony is not necessarily conclusive. (Bullman v. Cooper, 362 Ill. 469, 476 (1936).) By the very nature of these proceedings, the burden is on the objector, and the one alleging illegal residency has the burden of proof. (Dorsey v. Brigham, 177 Ill. Dec. 250, at 261 (1898).) Further, while proving a negative such as that the objector seeks to prove may not need to be by A[full and conclusive proof,@ still a presumption in favor of the legality of a vote (and by analogy residence) arises, and Ait is necessary that the proof should be at least sufficient to render the existence of the negative probable in order to overcome the presumption.@ Id. at 262. A ballot cast by the voter prevails as the highest evidence of his intention as to his residence. Bahrensmeyer v. Kreitz, 135 Ill. 591, 604, 20 N.E. 704.

III. RESIDENCY CASES DEMONSTRATE THAT ILLINOIS LAW ESTABLISHES A LIBERAL STANDARD OF RESIDENCY, PROMOTION, RATHER THAN LIMITING, BALLOT ACCESS.

The case of Dillavou v. Co. Officers Electoral Board, 260 Ill.App.3d 127, 198 Ill.Dec. 516, 632 N.E.2d 1127 (1994) is one which is highly supportive of the candidate. There, like here, the court upheld a residency where that candidate specifically wished to maintain a residence in connection with an elective office district. There, like here, that candidate divided his time between two locations, renting a utility apartment, without a lease, in the district in which he desired to be. One difference, of course is that in Dillavou, that candidate was seeking to abandon his original residence while here, our candidate seeks to retain his original location.

The Dillavou court quoted an earlier supreme court decision which stated:

We have frequently held, that when a party leaves his residence, or acquires a new one, it is the intention with which he does so that is to control. Hence the shortest absence, if at the time intended as a permanent abandonment, is sufficient, although the party may soon afterwards change his intention: while, on the other hand, an absence for months, or even years, if all the while intended as a mere temporary absence for some temporary purpose, to be followed by a resumption of the former residence, will not be abandonment

Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer (1888), 125 Ill. 141, 195, 17 N.E. 232, 253. [emphasis added].

Of further import to this case is the evidence that the candidate was registered to vote and did vote from the Lombard address, after the order of protection was entered. There is a legion of cases holding that a vote is presumed valid. Blankenship v. Israel, (1890), 132 Ill. 514; Stevenson v. Baker, 347 Ill. 304, 315 (1932). Indeed, that presumption covers residency. City of Beardstown v. City of Virginia, 81 Ill. 541, 549 (1876).

IV. EVEN IF THIS BOARD WERE TO FIND THAT THE CANDIDATE WAS INELIGIBLE TO RUN BECAUSE OF LACK OF RESIDENCY, THAT FACT DOES NOT DISQUALIFY HER AS A CIRCULATOR.

In recent years, the courts have considered whether a circulator who is not registered at the address she gives on the nomination papers is valid. The issue was definitively resolved by the Illinois Supreme Court in the case of Lucas v. Lakin, ____Ill.2d ____ (Ill.Sup.Ct. No. 80719, Jan. 30, 1997). Justice Mary Ann McMorrow's opinion for the court holds that a circulator's address is essentially irrelevant. The court upheld the validity of petitions where the circulator had not changed his registration to the address he gave on the nomination papers.

There is no dispute that __________is, and has been at all pertinent times, registered from the address given on the nomination papers. Therefore, this board must collaterally invalidate __________voter registration B something which this board cannot do. The Illinois Supreme Court's Lucas decision says as much. The objector in that case urged that since the circulator had moved, his voter registration at the old address was invalid. The Lucas court rejected that argument, stating:

Analogizing to Greene v. Board of Election Commissioners, 112 Ill.App.3d 862 (1983)], Lakin maintains that it is difficult to verify that a circulator has met the statutory requirement of being registered to vote when the circulator's voter registration address and the address given in the circulator's affidavit are not identical. Lakin asserts that, as in Greene, this difficulty provides a compelling justification for requiring that the address listed in the circulator's affidavit and the circulator's voter registration address match one another. Lakin concludes, therefore, that the legislature must have intended for section 3-1.2 to apply to circulators.

Contrary to Lakin's assertions, we do not believe that the need to facilitate the process of verifying the voter registration of petition circulators is necessarily as compelling as the need to facilitate the verification process for those who sign the nominating petition. First, unlike the individuals who sign the nominating petition to endorse the listed candidate, the circulator must make a sworn statement that he or she is a registered voter. Thus, the circulator is subject to an additional constraint which by itself, helps ensure that the circulator is registered to vote. In addition, in any nominating petition, there are far fewer circulators than there are individuals signing the petition. Therefore, as a practical matter, verifying the registration of circulator is less burdensome than verifying the registration of individuals who sign the nominating petition. These factors, in conjunction with the plain language of the statue, provide the basis for concluding that the legislature intended to limit the reach of section 3-1.2 to individuals who sign a nominating petition in support of the listed candidate. * * * We are mindful of the need to tread cautiously when construing statutory language which restricts the people's right to endorse and nominate the candidate of their choice.

Under this new and compelling precedent, the sheets circulated by __________cannot be invalidated under any circumstances.

CONCLUSION

The harsh objection ignores the reality of modern life. Under the objections, persons unable to sleep in their usual bedrooms because of destruction by fire, tornado or other disaster could not claim that home as a residence. Multiple sleeping locations are maintained by college students, those with vacation homes, and those who leave home for extended business or military service. However, in the context of the election laws, a permanent abode is all that is required. The candidate has to have at least one permanent abode or residence. This record does not demonstrate what residence she has except ___________________.

For these reasons, the candidate requests that this board overrule the objection.
Respectfully submitted,
_______________________________
Attorneys for Candidates

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